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The Treasury Department makes available to the public considerable information about foreign
holdings of its securities. Nevertheless, it is not possible to determine from the published data
exactly which foreigners own U.S. Treasury debt and how much of this debt is in foreign hands.
public.  Rather, the inability of both policymakers and 
private sector analysts to determine with full accuracy the
foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury debt—whether held
by private or official investors—stems not only from the
Treasury Department’s obligation to respect the confiden-
tiality of individual respondents but also from the nature
of the reporting requirements themselves.
The purpose of this edition of Current Issues is to shed
light on what data the U.S. government collects and pub-
lishes on foreign holdings of Treasury securities.  In addi-
tion, the article seeks to identify what both policymakers
and private sector analysts can and cannot know about the
ownership of these holdings.  Before turning to these
issues, the article briefly examines the extent of foreign
ownership of Treasury securities—as it is reported to the
Treasury—and the importance of these holdings for the
U.S. economy.
Magnitude of Foreign Holdings 
Reported foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury securities
not only is large but also has grown rapidly over the past
several decades (see chart).  From assets of about $20
billion in 1970, equivalent to almost 9 percent of pri-
vately held securities outstanding, holdings of Treasury
debt attributed to foreigners grew steadily throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, accounting for an average of
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Foreign ownership of U.S.Treasury securities has often
been the subject of considerable public debate.  Discus-
sion of this issue arises particularly at times of uncertainty
about either the outlook for the exchange value of the 
dollar or the need for cash in countries holding large
stocks of Treasury assets.  In June of 1997, for example,
there was a flurry of activity in the U.S. financial markets
when the Prime Minister of Japan, Ryutaro Hashimoto,
suggested that Japan might find it necessary to sell some
of its large Treasury holdings. 
OnthedayfollowingMr.Hashimoto’sremarks,theDow
Jones industrial average fell by 192 points, its largest
decline in a single day since the 508-point falloff on
October19,1987.1 WhilethePrimeMinister’sclarification
of his remarks subsequently calmed the markets, it did
nothingtoalterthepotentialvulnerabilityoftheU.S.finan-
cial markets to sudden decisions by foreign holders of U.S.
debttoundertakelarge-scalesalesoftheirdollarassets.
Knowing exactly which foreigners own specific
amounts of U.S. Treasury debt in a global market of about
$3.4 trillion in outstanding issues, however, is simply not
possible.  This inability to identify the ultimate foreign
owners of Treasury securities does not reflect a lack of
effort by the U.S. government to collect data on the 
foreign ownership of its debt.  Nor is it the result of any
governmental unwillingness to make data available to theroughly 19 percent during this time.2 In 1995, foreign
demand for Treasury securities began to outstrip the
increase in Treasury’s borrowing from the public, mak-
ing foreigners net buyers of Treasury debt from U.S.
holders (Table 1).  The percentage of privately held
Treasury debt reported to be held by foreigners rose to
an average of almost 30 percent in 1995-96.  In 1997,
foreigners continued to make large purchases of
Treasury securities, and by year-end their reported
share had climbed to almost 38 percent, or $1.3 trillion,
of the $3.4 trillion in privately held debt outstanding
(see chart).
As of February 1998, Treasury data attributed the
largest foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities to the
United Kingdom and Japan, where combined assets of
about $600 billion accounted for almost half of all
Treasury debt reported as foreign-owned (Table 2).
Investors in Germany, the Netherlands Antilles, Spain,
Mainland China, and Hong Kong were also shown 
to be substantial holders.  Between December 1996 and
February 1998, the Treasury debt attributed to foreign
official institutions—central banks and the international
financial institutions—declined steadily, from almost 
53 percent of all Treasury debt reportedly held by foreign-
ers to 45.8 percent, making private sector investors pri-
marily responsible for the net foreign purchases of
Treasury securities in 1997.
Why Foreigners Hold U.S. Treasury Securities
Private and official foreigners hold U.S. Treasury securi-
ties as a store of wealth and a means to conduct interna-
tional transactions.  Both groups of holders are sensitive
to interest rate differentials and the exchange rate value
Billions of dollars
Source:  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, Table OFS-2.
Holdings of Treasury Securities
Notes:  The chart reports holdings at end of period. Holdings include marketable 
and nonmarketable short- and long-term securities held by private investors. Debt 
held by foreigners includes investments of foreign and international accounts (both 
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Table 1
Foreign Purchases of Treasury Securities
Billions of Dollars
Total Borrowing Amount Borrowed 







Source:  U.S. Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1999 (1998), Table 13-6, p. 255.
Notes:  Data are for the end of each fiscal year. The figures in rows 1-3 are yearly
averages over the periods indicated.
aDefined as the change in debt held by the public from the beginning of the year to
the end, except to the extent that the amount of debt is changed by reclassification.
Table 2
Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities
Billions of Dollars
December December February
Country 1996 1997 1998
United Kingdom 190.6 286.9 304.9
Japan 286.4 300.7 296.9
Germany 72.5 91.2 92.0
Netherlands Antilles 63.9 61.6 54.7
OPEC countries 44.0 52.5 50.7
Spain 46.4 53.9 49.8
Mainland China 46.6 47.3 47.7
Hong Kong 24.9 37.3 36.5
Singapore 39.2 34.9 33.9
Taiwan 32.0 29.8 30.7
Switzerland 31.3 25.6 26.9
Belgium-Luxembourg 14.0 27.0 25.8
Canada 26.9 25.2 25.4
Mexico 19.9 18.0 18.2
France 9.6 8.1 11.1
Thailand 16.9 9.9 8.8
South Korea 9.9 5.2 6.4
All othera 160.4 162.9 166.8
Total 1135.4 1278.0 1287.2
Of which,
foreign official holders 599.2 594.4 590.1
(percent) (52.8) (46.5) (45.8)
Source:  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Economic Policy/International Financial
Analysis, April 27, 1998 {online}; available http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt.
Notes:  The table reports estimated holdings of marketable and nonmarketable short-
and long-term securities at the end of the period. Data are released monthly.
aIncludes repurchase agreements outstanding at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York with foreign official and international accounts.3
of the dollar relative to the other major currencies that
might be held for the same broad purposes.  Whereas pri-
vate holders might use the dollars provided by 
their Treasury assets to purchase imports from the
United States or third countries, official holders—
primarily central banks—might use the dollars from their
holdings to defend the value of their countries’ curren-
cies in foreign exchange markets.  Depending on the pur-
poses for which foreigners hold Treasury securities, they
will vary the maturity of their assets among shorter and
longer term instruments.  Short-term Treasury bills have
a maturity of one year or less while longer term notes
and bonds have maturities ranging from more than one
year to up to thirty years.
In deciding whether to hold, add to, or sell their
Treasury assets, both official and private investors will
consider, among other issues, the political and economic
climate in the United States and their own need for dollar-
denominated assets.  Uncertainty about the outlook for
U.S. interest rates or the exchange rate of the dollar as
well as any major shock to the U.S., global, or home-
country economy could prompt any of these investors to
sell their Treasury holdings and shift their dollar assets
into another currency.  If these sales were to take place in
a substantial amount, they could drive up U.S. interest
rates and have wide-ranging effects on U.S. financial 
markets.  For example, sharp increases in U.S. interest
rates stemming from such sales could significantly raise
the costs of borrowing and investing for U.S. residents as
well as the costs incurred by the U.S. government in
financing its debt.
Any widespread sell-off of U.S. Treasury securities, of
course, could also potentially drive down the prices of the
remaining Treasury assets held and cause substantial
losses on further sales.  In practice, however, the unsettled
economic conditions that might lead some investors to
sell their Treasury securities could be the same forces that
encourage “flight-to-quality” buying by other investors.
Data Collected by the Treasury on Foreign Holdings
The Treasury collects data on foreign ownership of its
debt so as to be able to report on the capital account of the
U.S. balance of payments and the international invest-
ment position of the United States.  In soliciting data for
these reports, the Treasury Department assures respon-
dents that the information they provide will be held in
confidence by it and the Federal Reserve banks acting as
its fiscal agents.  Further, it assures respondents that any
published information will be aggregated and will not
reveal the amounts reported by individual respondents.
The Treasury Department gathers data on foreign activ-
ity in its securities from banks and other depository institu-
tions located in the United States—including the branches,
agencies, and banking subsidiaries of foreign banks—as
well as brokers and dealers located here.3 It does not solicit
information from institutions located abroad.
Respondents are required to complete two forms, the
BL-2 form for custody holdings in short-term securities
and the S form for transactions in long-term securities.
The BL-2, which applies to Treasury securities with orig-
inal maturities of one year or less, asks respondents to
report monthly on custodial liabilities to foreigners,
including short-term Treasury securities, amounting to
$15 million or more.4
The S form is used for reporting securities with origi-
nal maturities of more than one year.  It asks respondents
to provide information on a monthly basis about all for-
eign purchases and sales of  long-term Treasury securi-
ties, among other securities, if either the purchase or the
sale in a given month amounts to $2 million or more.5
The report form considers as foreign a transaction that is
executed either in the United States for the account of 
foreigners or abroad for the respondent’s own account or
the account of its U.S. customers.  In a memorandum 
section, the form asks respondents to show transactions
undertaken for the account of foreign official institu-
tions—central banks as well as the Bank for International
Settlements—and international and regional organiza-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank.
The way in which a purchase or a sale of a Treasury
security is reported is always based on the viewpoint of the
foreigner.  For example, a reporting institution’s purchase
from a foreigner of a long-term security for its own account
or for the account of its U.S. customers is recorded as a sale
by a foreigner.  Conversely, the same institution’s sale of a
long-term security to a foreigner for its own account or for
the account of a U.S. customer is reported as a purchase by
a foreigner.  In other words, a purchase by a foreigner is a
sale by a U.S. resident, and vice versa.
Why the Data Collected Do Not Identify the Ultimate
Foreign Ownership of the Securities
In addition to the Treasury’s obligation to ensure the confi-
dentiality of data reported by individual respondents, the
main impediment to identifying the ultimate owners of
Treasury securities arises from the reporting guidelines on
the BL-2 and S forms that specify who is considered for-
eign and how the nationality of a foreign holder is to be
determined.  For example, any individual, including a U.S.
citizen, who lives outside the United States is considered
foreign.  Any partnership, association, corporation, or
other organization created or organized under the laws 
of a foreign country is considered foreign—except thebranches, agencies, and subsidiaries of these institutions
located in the United States.  Similarly, any foreign branch,
subsidiary, or other affiliate of a U.S. organization is con-
sidered foreign.  Thus, while a foreign bank’s U.S.
branches, agencies, and subsidiaries are considered U.S.
persons, its head offices and branches located outside the
United States are considered foreign.6 Simply put, it is the
location of an entity that determines whether that entity is
considered domestic or foreign for reporting purposes.
In providing information to the Treasury, U.S. report-
ing institutions are asked to list transactions with foreign-
ers on the line opposite the name of the foreign country
or geographical area in which the foreigner resides.
Transactions with foreign branches or agencies of for-
eign banks—excluding central banks—and other private
institutions must be reported on the line opposite the
country in which the foreign branch or agency is located.
For example, a U.S. institution’s transaction with the
Sydney, Australia, branch of a French firm is reported
opposite Australia and not opposite France.
Because liabilities to foreigners reported on the BL-2
form are listed opposite the country where the foreigner
resides and transactions reported on the S form are typi-
cally listed opposite the country where the foreign institu-
tion undertakes the transaction—rather than opposite the
country of the person or firm on whose behalf the foreign
institution may be acting—it is not possible to know 
precisely who the ultimate holders of U.S. Treasury 
securities are.  An example may help clarify this point.
If a U.S. bank buys a long-term Treasury security from
a Japanese resident’s account with Merrill Lynch in
London, the transaction will be reported as a sale by a U.K.
resident and not a Japanese resident.  If the same transac-
tion were to take place on behalf of a U.K. resident’s
account with Merrill Lynch in London, the sale would be
recorded opposite the United Kingdom, and a U.K. resi-
dent would in fact be the foreign seller of the security.
It is not difficult to see from this example that the
Treasury data—whether made available to the public or
not—do not necessarily reflect the nationality of the 
ultimate owner of, or transactor in, the security.7 Many
foreign holders of Treasury securities, private as well as
official, may decide to hold their Treasury assets in
accounts outside their own countries precisely because
they wish to avoid public or official scrutiny of their hold-
ings or their buying and selling activity.8 There is, of
course, nothing illegal about these decisions.  Moreover,
these  decisions undoubtedly account for the particularly
large holdings of Treasury securities that are reported for
countries such as the United Kingdom, which is a major
world financial center, and the Netherlands Antilles,
which is a major offshore financial center (Table 2).
Data Made Available to the Public 
The Treasury Department makes available to the public
in its quarterly Bulletin a great deal of the data it col-
lects on foreign holdings of its securities.  Some of this
information is included in the monthly Federal Reserve
Bulletin, which also makes available data on the
Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve for for-
eign official institutions.9 The Commerce Department’s
Bureau of Economic Analysis incorporates the Treasury
data when it reports quarterly on the U.S. balance of
payments and the international investment position of
the United States in the Survey of Current Business.10
In January 1998, the Treasury Department also created
a web page on the Internet.  Among the data it publishes
on its web site are monthly reports on foreign holdings
of its securities.  The table containing this information
lists the countries that the Treasury identifies as the
major holders of its debt and the percentage of the debt
held by foreign official institutions (shown in Table 2).
The Treasury reports data on short-term securities on a
stock basis—that is, on the amount of debt outstanding;
the data on long-term securities are on a flow, or transac-
tions, basis.  To update its estimates of the long-term
securities held by foreigners, the Treasury undertakes a
benchmark survey every five years.  One such report is
due to be published in 1998 for holdings as of the end of
1994.  The current estimated stock of foreign holdings is
based on the benchmark survey as of year-end 1989 and
cumulative transactions since that date.
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Table 3





Total Institutionsa Banksb Foreigners
1970-79 38.2 37.8 0.2 0.2
1980-89 77.5 66.8 7.6 3.1
1990-94 133.2 113.5 10.2 9.5
1995 197.0 168.5 15.9 12.6
1996 236.5 198.9 23.1 14.5
1997c 193.4 148.3 31.9 13.2
Source:  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, Table CM-I-2. 
A companion table, CM-I-4, shows this information by country, but aggregates the
holdings of foreign official institutions with those of unaffiliated foreign banks and
excludes the holdings of “other foreigners.”
Note:  The figures in rows 1-3 are yearly averages over the periods indicated.
aIncludes the Bank for International Settlements.
bFigures may include Treasury bills and certificates held in custody by foreign
banks for official institutions.
cPreliminary.The Treasury Department’s quarterly Bulletin pre-
sents  a variety of tables containing information on for-
eign ownership of Treasury securities.  Some of the
tables (summarized in Tables 3 and 4) break down for-
eign owners into private and official holders of short- or
long-term Treasury debt but do not distinguish among
countries, while other tables look at foreign holdings of
short- and long-term debt across countries but do not
distinguish between official and private holders.  In
addition, although the tables on short-term securities
include information on holdings by official institutions,
they do not fully separate official from private holdings
at banks:  the holdings reported for banks may include
assets held in custody by foreign banks for official insti-
tutions (see Table 3).  Further, official holdings of short-
term Treasury securities do not reflect central bank posi-
tions alone but also include the holdings of the Bank for
International Settlements, which frequently invests on
behalf of various central banks.
What the Publicly Available Data 
Show and Do Not Show 
While considerable information on foreign holdings of
Treasury securities is made available to the public, many
facets of activity in Treasury securities simply cannot be
known and must remain speculative for public and offi-
cial observers alike.  In a deep and fluid global market of
$3.4 trillion in privately held Treasury securities—where
transactions among brokers average between $100 billion
and $150 billion a day—ownership of Treasury debt is
constantly changing.
From the data published, it is not possible to know
precisely who owns U.S. Treasury debt and how much of
this debt is in foreign hands.  While the Treasury data
can identify the countries where investors have been net
buyers or sellers of securities in any given month and
can better estimate the holdings of individual countries
for those years in which benchmark surveys are taken,
the nationality of those ultimately owning the securities
or undertaking transactions in them still cannot be fully
known. Moreover, because benchmark surveys are con-
ducted only at five-year intervals and because their find-
ings are published with long lags, estimates of foreign
ownership of Treasury debt become increasingly less
accurate as the years pass between one survey and the
next.  In addition, it is not possible to know precisely the
percentage of foreign debt that is held by the official as
opposed to the private sector because the data published
on short-term Treasury  holdings by banks may include
Treasury bills and certificates held in custody by foreign
banks for official institutions.
Further, although it is possible to determine whether for-
eign official institutions as a group are buying or selling
long-term Treasury securities from month to month—
unless those institutions are acting through intermediaries
abroad—the Treasury data do not reveal the actions of any
individual country’s central bank at any given time nor indi-
cate whether that central bank is buying or selling Treasury
bills, notes, or bonds.  Any press or other reports stating
that a specific country’s central bank is unloading Treasury
securities for whatever reason are, therefore, based on
purely speculative or anecdotal evidence.  These activities
simply cannot be known from published Treasury data.
More broadly, because the Treasury’s reporting system is
designed to record only those capital movements that cross
U.S. borders, Treasury data do not capture the activity in
Treasury securities—which may be considerable—under-
taken by foreign institutions with each other.  For example,
transactions in Treasury securities of Japanese banks in
Tokyo with other foreign institutions will not appear in the
Treasury’s U.S.-based reporting network.  Only if a Japanese
bank in Tokyo is dealing with an institution located in the
United States will these activities be reported.
Conclusion
In presenting data to the public, the Treasury
Department has a responsibility not to divulge any 
individual information reported.  Given the depth and
breadth of the U.S. Treasury markets, any breach of this
confidence could mean that foreigners—private as well
as official—might be less willing to buy U.S. assets or to
hold these assets in U.S.-based institutions.  Such an
eventuality could lead to a rise in U.S. interest rates,
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Table 4
Net Foreign Purchases of Long-Term Marketable




Official Other and Regional 
Total Institutions Foreigners Institutions
1970-79 4.5 3.7 0.3 0.5
1980-89 24.1 13.8 10.2 0.1
1990-94 35.9 14.9 20.6 0.4
1995 134.1 39.6 94.0 0.4
1996 232.2 85.8 148.3 -1.8
1997a 183.6 43.1 140.1 0.4
Source:  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, Table CM-V-1. 
A companion table, CM-V-3, shows total net foreign purchases of long-term 
marketable Treasury securities by country; Tables CM-V-4 (quarterly) and 
CM-V-5 (annual) present similar data for gross purchases and sales.
Note:  The figures in rows 1-3 are yearly averages over the periods indicated.
aPreliminary.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
increasing financing costs for the U.S. government and
residents as well as weakening the profitability of U.S.
firms and their ability to compete effectively in global
financial markets.
Because the Treasury Department must respect the
confidentiality of its respondents and because the infor-
mation it compiles may not necessarily reflect the nation-
ality of those holding its assets—or the precise amount of
its assets held by foreigners—it is not possible to con-
clude with certainty from published data that private or
official investors in any individual country are behaving
in a particular way at any given time.  Thus, while a good
deal of information estimating foreign holdings of U.S.
Treasury securities is made public, analysts using the data
must be cautious in drawing conclusions about the foreign
ownership of U.S. Treasury debt.
Notes
1. See “Blue Chips Plunge on Remarks by Hashimoto,” Wall Street
Journal, June 24, 1997; “Bond Prices Ease After Japan’s Prime
Minister Suggests Possible Sale of Some U.S. Treasurys,” Wall
Street Journal, June 24, 1997; “Why Japan Won’t Dump U.S.
Treasurys,” New York Times, June 25, 1997; “Hashimoto Rocks
Dollar Only Briefly,” Financial Times, June 25, 1997.
2. The discussion of Treasury securities refers to marketable and
nonmarketable debt, unless otherwise indicated. 
3. A more detailed list of the institutions asked to provide information
includes the following: all banks, other depository institutions (includ-
ing commercial banks; Edge Act and Agreement Corporations;
branches, agencies, and banking subsidiaries of foreign banks; build-
ing or savings and loan associations; mutual or stock savings banks;
cooperative banks; credit unions; homestead associations; and 
consumer banks), International Banking Facilities, bank holding com-
panies, and brokers and dealers.
4. The respondent may hold these liabilities to foreigners either in
direct custody or in its own name with a custodian bank or other
institution.  Once the $15 million level is reached, the respondent
must report for the remainder of the calendar year.
5. Once the $2 million criterion is met for either a purchase or a
sale,  the other type of transaction (purchase or sale) must also be
reported, even if the total amount does not exceed $2 million.
6. Also considered foreign is any government of a foreign country,
including all foreign official institutions, even if these are located in
the United States.  In addition, official and regional organizations
representing multiple countries are considered foreign—even if
these organizations have their headquarters in the United States.
7. The Treasury’s approach to identifying nationality reflects the
fact that its reporting system is designed to collect data on U.S. port-
folio capital movements for U.S. international accounts.  The system
is not intended to be a registry of international claims and liabilities.
8. Investors may also be motivated by such considerations as taxes,
transactions costs, and time differences between markets.
9. The Treasury Bulletin has no table corresponding to Table 3.13 of
the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which reports a total dollar amount for
foreign official assets held in custody at the Federal Reserve banks,
excluding those assets held for international and regional organiza-
tions.  Table 3.13 does not break down the holdings by either matu-
rity or country.  Also excluded from the total are holdings by foreign 
official institutions at banks or other depository institutions in the
United States.  The Federal Reserve also publishes this information
in its weekly H.4.1 release.  U.S. Treasury securities held on behalf
of foreign official institutions rose from a reported $442 billion at
the end of 1994 to $606 billion as of May 6, 1998.
10. For a variety of reasons, these different sources do not present
identical data.
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